2018年1月15日 星期一

創傷性腦病變是不治之症?美式足球, 老兵, 拳擊

博主之內容提要:  美国职业橄榄球大联盟球員離世後捐贈作研究的大腦標本共111個, 其中110個有創傷性腦病變 CTE (不治之症). 阿富汗美兵只要經歷一次路邊炸彈 IDE, 縱使生還, 很大機會(102個老兵66個有症狀)患上創傷性腦病變CTE . 目前從戰場返美的三十萬老兵, 經歷多次路邊炸彈者因為創傷性腦病變而慢慢死去一批. 消息一旦流傳, 美國可能從此招不到步兵, 從而放棄好戰策略, 或依賴機器人作戰. 

轉載自:  https://www.cbsnews.com/news/combat-veterans-coming-home-with-cte (有片)

2018 Jan 07   Correspondent Sharyn Alfonsi

什麼是 CTE https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/慢性創傷性腦病變 
什麼是 IDE  https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/簡易爆炸裝置

Until a few years ago, NFL players who struggled with severe depression, bouts of rage and memory loss in their retirement were often told they were just having a hard time adjusting to life away from the game. Doctors have since learned these changes can be symptoms of the degenerative brain disease CTE -- chronic traumatic encephalopathy, caused by blows to the head.
What we're learning now is that CTE isn't just affecting athletes, but also showing up in our nation's heroes. Since 9/11 over 300,000 soldiers have returned home with brain injuries. Researchers fear the impact of CTE could cripple a generation of warriors.
When Joy Kieffer buried her 34-year old son this past summer, it was the end of a long goodbye.

Kieffer's son, Sgt. Kevin Ash, enlisted in the Army Reserves at the age of 18. Over three deployments, he was exposed to 12 combat blasts, many of them roadside bombs. He returned home in 2012 a different man.
Joy Kieffer: His whole personality had changed. I thought it was exposure to all of the things that he had seen, and he had just become harder. You know, but he was -- he was not happy.
Sharyn Alfonsi: So at this point, you're thinking this decline, this change in my child is just that he's been in war and he's seen too much.
Joy Kieffer: Right.
Sharyn Alfonsi: Did he tell you about blasts that he experienced during that time?
Joy Kieffer: Uh-huh.
Sharyn Alfonsi: What did he--tell you?
Joy Kieffer: That they shook him. And he was having blackouts. And -- it frightened him.
Ash withdrew from family and friends. He was angry. Depressed. Doctors prescribed therapy and medication, but his health began to decline quickly. By his 34th birthday, Sgt. Kevin Ash was unable to speak, walk or eat on his own.    
Sharyn Alfonsi: Looking back on it now, was there anything you feel like he could've done?
Joy Kieffer: Uh-uh.
Sharyn Alfonsi: Because?
Joy Kieffer: Because it was-- it-- it was his brain. The thing I didn't know was that his brain was continuing to die. I mean, before he went into the service he said, "you know, I could come back with no legs, or no arms, or even blind, or I could be shot, I could die," but nobody ever said that he could lose his mind one day at a time.
His final wish was to serve his country one last time by donating his brain to science -- a gesture he thought would bring better understanding to the invisible wounds of war.
Joy reached out to the VA-Boston University-Concussion Legacy Foundation Brain Bank where neuropathologist Dr. Ann McKee is leading the charge in researching head trauma and the degenerative brain disease CTE.
McKee has spent fourteen years looking at the postmortem brains of hundreds of athletes who suffered concussions while playing their sport.
This past summer, her findings shook the football world when she discovered CTE in the brains of 110 out of 111 deceased NFL players -- raising serious concerns for those in the game today.
And when Dr. McKee autopsied Patriots tight-end Aaron Hernandez who killed himself after being convicted of murder, she found the most severe case of CTE ever, in someone under 30.
Now she's seeing a similar pattern in deceased veterans who experienced a different kind of head trauma -- combat blasts. Of the 102 veterans' brains Dr. Mckee's examined, 66 had CTE.
Sharyn Alfonsi: I can understand a football player who keeps, you know, hitting his head, and having impact and concussions. But how is it that a combat veteran, who maybe just experienced a blast, has the same type of injury?
Dr. Ann McKee: This blast injury causes a tremendous sort of-- ricochet or-- or-- a whiplash injury to the brain inside the skull and that's what gives rise to the same changes that we see in football players, as in military veterans.

"This is a disease and a problem that we're going to be dealing with for decades. And it's a huge public health problem. It's a huge problem for the Veterans Administration. It's a huge moral responsibility for all of us."

Blast trauma was first recognized back in World War I. Known as 'shell shock,' poorly protected soldiers often died immediately or went on to suffer physical and psychological symptoms.  Today, sophisticated armor allows more soldiers to walk away from an explosion but exposure can still damage the brain -- an injury that can worsen over time.
Dr. Ann McKee: It's not a new injury. But what's been really stumping us, I think, as-- as physicians is it's not easily detectable, right? It's-- you've got a lot of psychiatric symptoms-- and you can't see it very well on images of the brain and so it didn't occur to us. And I think that's been the gap, really, that this has been what everyone calls an invisible injury.
Dr. Ann McKee: This is the world's largest CTE brain bank.
The only foolproof way to diagnose CTE is by testing a post-mortem brain.
Sharyn Alfonsi: So these are full of hundreds of brains...
Dr. Ann McKee: Hundreds of brains, thousands really...
Researchers carefully dissect sections of the brain where they look for changes in the folds of the frontal lobes - an area responsible for memory, judgement, emotions, impulse control and personality.Dr. Ann McKee: Do you see there's a tiny little hole there? That is an abnormality. And it's a clear abnormality.
Sharyn Alfonsi: And what would that affect?
Dr. Ann McKee: Well, it's part of the memory circuit. You can see that clear hole there that shouldn't be there. It's connecting the important memory regions of the brain with other regions. So that is a sign of CTE.
Thin slivers of the affected areas are then stained and viewed microscopically. It's in these final stages where a diagnosis becomes clear as in the case of Sgt. Kevin Ash.
Sharyn Alfonsi: So this is Sergeant Ash's brain?
Dr. Ann McKee: Right. This is-- four sections of his brain. And what you can see is-- these lesions. The, and those lesions are CTE And they're in very characteristic parts of the brain. They're at the bottom of the crevice. That's a unique feature of CTE.Sharyn Alfonsi: And in a healthy brain, you wouldn't see any of those kind of brown spots?
Dr. Ann McKee: No, no, it would be completely clear. And then when you look microscopically, you can see that the tau, which is staining brown and is inside nerve cells is surrounding these little vessels.
Sharyn Alfonsi: And explain, what is the tau?
Dr. Ann McKee: So tau is a protein that's normally in the nerve cell. It helps with structure and after trauma, it starts clumping up as a toxin inside the nerve cell. And over time, and even years, gradually that nerve cell dies.
Dr. Lee Goldstein has been building on Dr. McKee's work with testing on mice.  
Inside his Boston University lab, Dr. Goldstein built a 27-foot blast tube where a mouse - and in this demonstration, a model - is exposed to an explosion equivalent to the IEDs used in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Dr. Lee Goldstein: When it reaches about 25 this thing is going to go.
Dr. Goldstein's model shows what's going on inside the brain during a blast. The brightly colored waves illustrate stress on the soft tissues of the brain as it ricochets back and forth within the skull.
Dr. Lee Goldstein: What we see after these blast exposures, the animals actually look fine. Which is shocking to us. So they come out of what is a near lethal blast exposure, just like our military service men and women do. And they appear to be fine. But what we know is that that brain is not the same after that exposure as it was microseconds before. And if there is a subsequent exposure, that change will be accelerated. And ultimately, this triggers a neurodegenerative disease. And, in fact, we can see that really after even one of these exposures.
Sharyn Alfonsi: The Department of Defense estimates hundreds of thousands of soldiers have experienced a blast like this. What does that tell you?
Dr. Lee Goldstein: This is a disease and a problem that we're going to be dealing with for decades. And it's a huge public health problem. It's a huge problem for the Veterans Administration. It's a huge moral responsibility for all of us.
A responsibility owed to soldiers like 33-year-old Sgt. Tom Bates.
Sgt. Tom Bates: We were struck with a large IED. It was a total devastation strike.Bates miraculously walked away from a mangled humvee -- one of four IED blasts he survived during deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Sharyn Alfonsi: Do you remember feeling the impact in your body?
Sgt. Tom Bates: Yes. Yeah.
Sharyn Alfonsi: What does that feel like?
Sgt. Tom Bates: Just basically like getting hit by a train.
Sharyn Alfonsi: And you were put back on the frontlines.
Sgt. Tom Bates: Yes.
Sharyn Alfonsi: And that was it?
Sgt. Tom Bates: Uh-huh
When Bates returned home in 2009, his wife Libby immediately saw a dramatic change.Libby Bates: I thought, "Something is not absolutely right here. Something's going on. For him to just lay there and to sob and be so sad. You know, what do you do for that? How do I-- how do I help him?  He would look at me and say, "If it wasn't for you, I would end it all right now." You know, I mean, like, what do you-- what do you do-- and what do you say to somebody who says that? You know I love this man so much. And --
Sharyn Alfonsi: You're going to the VA, you're getting help, but did you feel like you weren't getting answers?
Sgt. Tom Bates: Yes.
Sharyn Alfonsi: And so you took it into your own hands and started researching?
Sgt. Tom Bates:  I knew the way everything had gone and how quick a lot of my neurological issues had progressed that something was wrong. And I just-- I wanted answers for it.
That led him to New York's Mount Sinai Hospital where neurologist Dr. Sam Gandy is trying to move beyond diagnosing CTE only in the dead by using scans that test for the disease in the living.
Dr. Sam Gandy: By having this during life, this now gives us for the first time the possibility of estimating the true prevalence of the disease. It's important to estimate prevalence so that people can have some sense of what the risk is.
In the past year, 36 veterans and athletes have been tested for the disease here. Tom Bates asked to be a part of it.
That radioactive tracer - known as t807 - clings to those dead clusters of protein known as tau, which are typical markers of the disease.  
Through the course of a 20 minute PET scan, high resolution images are taken of the brain and then combined with MRI results to get a 360 degree picture of whether there are potential signs of CTE.
Scan results confirmed what Tom and Libby had long suspected.
On the right, we see a normal brain scan with no signs of CTE next to Tom's brain where tau deposits, possible markers of CTE, are bright orange.Dr. Sam Gandy: Here these could be responsible for some of the anxiety and depression he's suffered and we're concerned it will progress.
Sgt. Tom Bates: My hope is that this study becomes more prominent, and gets to more veterans, and stuff like that so we can actually get, like, a reflection of what population might actually have this.
There is no cure for CTE.
Dr. Gandy hopes his trial will lead to drug therapies so he can offer some relief to patients like Tom.
Dr. Ann McKee believes some people may be at higher risk of getting the disease than others.
While examining NFL star Aaron Hernandez's brain she identified a genetic bio-marker she believes may have predisposed him to CTE.
A discovery that could have far-reaching implications on the football field and battlefield.
Sharyn Alfonsi: Do you think you will ever be your old self again?
Sgt. Tom Bates: I don't ever see me being my old self again. I think it's just too far gone.
Sharyn Alfonsi: So what's your hope then?
Sgt. Tom Bates: Just to not become worse than I am now.
Produced by Ashley Velie. Associate producer, Dina Zingaro.
For families who wish to donate a brain for research please contact the CTE Center/Brain Bank Directly:
Bobbie Abdolmohammadi - 617-414-1184
Laney Evers - 617-414-1187
To sign up to pledge to donate your brain to Dr. Ann McKee's research, please visit https://concussionfoundation.org/pledge

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How IEDs may be physically causing PTSD

Scar tissue found in the brains of combat veterans who suffered from PTSD could mean that many cases of the disorder are caused by physical trauma

颱風限制了香港的發展

前幾年有興趣研究一下趙正義的塔基(赵氏塔基)會不會在香港得到應用, 例如沙田頭路便有一中國路橋的地盤.  後來打颱風了, 二座天秤都不為所動, 要是利用趙正義的活動(可拆解)塔基, 預料銀行保險都不會承擔風險.

打颱風時, 地下鐵路, 東鐵線, 馬鐵都會維持運作, 雖然公共汽車停走了.  將來元朗屯門的架空鐵路設計, 應該維持颱風下繼續運作的優良傳統. 

2018年1月13日 星期六

西班牙大力神燈塔Tower of Hercules

古羅馬人會給燈塔装避雷針?  比較古羅馬人在西班牙的另一支燈塔 - 奇皮奧娜燈塔 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chipiona_Lighthouse   , 那支是沒有装避雷針的.  何解會有大柱將燈光掩蓋?





圖片來源: 上下圖:    https://inaciem.com/roman-empire/tower-of-hercules

以下轉載自維基百科 https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/埃库莱斯塔 

埃庫萊斯塔(加裡西亞語和西班牙語:Torre de Hércules)位於西班牙西北部,距離加利西亞拉科魯尼亞2.4公里的一個半島上。

Hércules 是希臘神話的大力神赫拉克勒斯,因此Torre de Hércules之意為赫拉克勒斯塔。 它建於古羅馬時期,是至今仍然使用的古羅馬時期燈塔中歷史最悠久的,距今約有1,900年。1791年曾經翻新。

 塔高55米,屹立於西班牙西北部大西洋岸上。此塔最早的文獻記載是在公元一、二世紀時,是現時西班牙第二高的燈塔,僅次於奇皮奧娜燈塔 Faro de Chipiona  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chipiona_Lighthouse 

這個塔內部有一個博物館,2009年被列入世界遺產。

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網上當代羅馬歷史學家的解說:

This is the oldest lighthouse still in operation in the world, nearly 2000 years of history, helping sailors looking for a guide in this troubled area of ​​the Atlantic.  The beauty, but also the usefulness of the venerable lighthouse is a symbol of what was the Roman Empire: a mix between business and pleasure, built primarily to perform a function that would serve every citizen.  It experienced  all the history of the Iberian Peninsula since the advent of Latin culture in the countries of western Europe. Source: https://inaciem.com/roman-empire/tower-of-hercules

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西班牙大力神燈塔Tower of Hercules (紅點)以南三十至四十公里則是天主教聖地亞哥德孔波斯特拉 Santiago de Compostela. 維基百科說是相傳耶穌十二門徒之一的大雅各安葬於此,是天主教朝聖勝地之一。自中世紀以來,前來此地的朝聖者絡繹不絕,乃至形成了一條有名的朝聖之路,即聖雅各之路。 聖地亞哥-德孔波斯特拉古城於1985年被列為世界文化遺產。搜索: Santiago de Compostela, botafumeiro (圖片及影片)



朝聖者多天不洗澡, 八名教士齊心協力用滑輪盪千秋似的將香爐(50至160公斤)散播焚香, 有沒有意外? One of the most renowned accidents took place during a visit of Princess Catherine of Aragon. She was on a journey to marry the heir to the English throne in 1499 and stopped by the cathedral in Santiago de Compostela. While it was being swung, the Botafumeiro flew out of the cathedral through the Platerias high window. No one was reported to have been injured on this occasion.The ropes and other devices securing the Botafumeiro have also failed; on May 23, 1622, and more recently in 1925 and July 1937. In 1622, the Botafumeiro fell at the feet of the tiraboleiros. In July 1937, the cords holding the Botafumeiro failed again, and hot coals were spilled onto the floor.  Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Botafumeiro



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西班牙大力神燈塔是否世俗和宗教之爭的結果?  


延伸閱讀:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persecution_of_Christians_in_the_Roman_Empire

西班牙加利西亞的死亡海岸







Wild, windy and at times desolate, the Costa da Morte, west of A Coruña, is often passed over by tourists heading south to the beaches of the Rías Baixas. But while the Costa da Morte lacks both the climate and the infrastructure for large-scale tourism, it’s not nearly as overdeveloped as the regions to the south, while boasting similarly beautiful coves, tiny fishing villages huddled against the headlands, and forested mountain slopes aplenty.






Its fearsome name, which means Coast of Death, stems from the constant buffeting the shoreline receives from the Atlantic waves. The most notorious of the countless shipwrecks that litter the sea bed is the oil tanker Prestige, which snapped in two following a ferocious storm in 2002. Although 77,000 tonnes of crude oil were released into the ocean, barely a trace of oil remained just twelve months later.






The coast from Camariñas to Fisterra is the most exposed and westerly stretch of all. Ever since a Roman expedition under Lucius Florus Brutus was brought up short by what seemed to be an endless sea, it has been known as finis terrae (the end of the world), and it is not hard to see why. This is prime territory, however, for hunting percebes (barnacles), one of Galicia’s most popular and expensive seafood delicacies, which have to be scooped up from the very waterline. Collectors are commonly swept away by the dreaded “seventh wave”, which can appear out of nowhere from a calm sea. (博主註: 每年五名岸邊挖狗爪螺者被捲入浪裡淹死)






Even where the isolated coves do shelter fine beaches, you will rarely find resort facilities. While the beaches may look splendid, braving the water is recommended for only the strongest of swimmers, and the climate is significantly wetter and windier here than it is a mere 100km or so further south.

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以下轉載自:https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/cms/farnet2/on-the-ground/flag-factsheets/costa-da-morte_en


The name of the coastal area of Costa da Morte (“Coast of Death”) refers to its partly rough and rocky shoreline. In between, the coastline which offers attractive beaches and areas of high environmental value.

The FLAG (Fisheries Areas Network, EU) has twelve small harbours which generate crucial employment for their immediate surroundings. Almost 300 small-scale fishing boats sell their catches at one of the seven auctions. Daily landings ensure the supply of high quality fish and seafood products. The canning industry is the only processing activity in the FLAGs territory.

In general, the area and especially small cities such as Camarinas, Malpice and Muxia struggle with high unemployment rates due to a lack of (quality) jobs, leading to a high number of young educated people leaving the region. This also leads to a decline and aging of the overall population.

Thanks to the geography of the area, which has many beaches with fine sand and several protected areas, tourism has emerged as an alternative to the decline of traditional industries. However, there is no common approach to fully tap into this opportunity because of a shortage of knowledge and services within this sector.

2018年1月12日 星期五

Central Asia's Looming Conflict Over Water

轉載自: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/central-asias-looming-conflict-over-water-part-1-upriver-countries

Summary

Two of Central Asia's poorest countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are attempting to leverage one of their few geographic advantages — control over the headwaters of two major regional rivers — to build new hydropower dams. The proposed dams, which were originally drawn up by the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s, offer the prospect of boosting electricity production both for domestic use and potentially for export to neighboring states.

Financing for the dams has not yet been secured, though Russia has periodically offered some assistance to each country. However, if the projects do proceed, the already tense relations are likely to become even more fraught between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and their richer downriver neighbors, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which depend on the rivers' waters. While military confrontations are unlikely in the near term, any developments that jeopardize the downriver countries' water supply could prompt a harsh response.

Under the Soviet Union, Central Asia was split into five Soviet republics. All administrative matters in these republics were decided by Moscow, including how the individual republics used and distributed their natural resources. When the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991, the former republics (now independent states) kept their Soviet-imposed borders, even though they were explicitly designed by Moscow to keep any one state from becoming powerful or independent enough to challenge the Kremlin's central authority. Consequently, these countries are dependent on one another for their natural resources and energy needs, which is a challenge now that each individual country, rather than Moscow, is responsible for managing those resources.

Resource Competition in Central Asia

Portions of the Central Asian steppe — especially Uzbekistan — were endowed with fertile soil and favorable weather patterns, making them well suited for agriculture, though the arid land requires irrigation. To create agricultural zones and provide sufficient water for other uses in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, the Soviet Union constructed extensive irrigation networks to redirect water from Central Asia's two largest rivers, the Syr Darya originating in Tajikistan and the Amu Darya originating in Kyrgyzstan.

Water diversion measures combined with inefficient infrastructure and general overuse have caused the rivers' drainage point, the Aral Sea, to lose about 75 percent of its water volume since the 1960s and become increasingly saline. This has reduced the sea's ability to provide a moderating effect on temperatures and has resulted in the desertification of the surrounding areas. Considering the increasing demand on and the possible reduction of the rivers' glacial sources, the already-strained water situation in the region looks set to grow tenser in the coming years.

This is the context under which Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan hope to build two new hydropower plants that could further reduce the water flow to downriver countries. Bishkek and Dushanbe want the power plants to expand their electrical production capacity, which could lessen their energy dependence on downstream countries, especially natural gas from Uzbekistan. These projects could eventually even allow the countries to export excess energy to China, Afghanistan and Pakistan if the necessary infrastructure is built, which would be extremely valuable for the two historically poor countries.

Proposed Hydroelectric Projects

Kyrgyzstan's proposed Kambarata-1 hydropower plant would be built on the Naryn River, a tributary of the Syr Darya, while Tajikistan's proposed Rogun hydropower plant would be built on the Vakhsh River, a tributary of the Amu Darya. These are two of the largest hydroelectric projects ever planned in Central Asia, with potential generating capacities of 1,900 megawatts and 3,600 megawatts, respectively.

Kambarata-1 and Rogun were designed by the Soviets to improve water management in Central Asia. Two significant sources of the region's river water are snowmelt and glacial thaw, and thus the flow slows in the winter months while becoming more rapid when temperatures heat up in the summer. Kambarata-1 and Rogun are designed to be able to better control the fluctuation of water flow by retaining water in reservoirs and releasing it when it is most needed. But this introduces competing goals for reservoir use: While the downriver areas need more water in the summer to irrigate their crops, the upriver regions require more water in the winter to generate hydroelectricity.

Both proposed dam projects have received external funding to carry out feasibility studies, but the estimated high costs of the dams make it impossible for Dushanbe and Bishkek to pay for them on their own. Kambarata-1 will cost an estimated $2-4 billion, while Rogun is projected at $2-3 billion. Considering Kyrgystan's gross domestic product was $5.9 billion in 2011 and Tajikistan's was $6.5 billion, foreign investment will be essential for the projects. Russia has proposed creating a joint-stock company with Kyrgyzstan to build Kambarata-1 and also paid for its feasibility study. But while Kyrgyz President Almaz Atambayev said construction would begin by spring 2013, the funding needed to begin, much less complete, the project has yet to materialize.


In the past, Russia has backed out on promises to fund such projects in Central Asia. At the end of 2004, Russian aluminum company RUSAL expressed interest in finishing construction of Tajikistan's Rogun hydropower plant, which the Soviets had begun in 1976 but never completed. RUSAL pulled out of the project, ostensibly over disagreements regarding the design of the dam and how much electricity should be allocated for residential versus industrial use. The actual reason for the withdrawal, however, was that Russia did not want to seriously provoke Uzbekistan by building a hydropower plant of such size.

Since then, however, the project has been revived. Projected to become the world's tallest dam if it is built to Tajikistan's specifications, Rogun is currently undergoing its second feasibility study, funded by the World Bank. The Tajik government raised less than $200 million for the project by forcing citizens to buy shares in it. But the rest of the $2 billion needed to build the project will likely have to come from foreign investment. Whether the funding for either dam comes from Russia will likely depend on how far the Kremlin feels it can push Uzbekistan rather than how interested it is in being a stakeholder in these two hydroelectric power plants.

While neither project will likely be completed in the near future, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have all expressed their concerns about how these new hydropower dams could affect them. These countries are worried that if the dams are built, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will hoard water in reservoirs during the summer months (when the downriver agricultural regions need it most) so the upriver countries can release it in the winter to generate hydroelectric power.

If the Rogun dam were to be built, it could affect the Vakhsh River's water flow — but this impact would likely not be felt for years. Some estimates indicate it could take more than a decade to fill Rogun's reservoir, during which time the river would probably only experience an estimated 1-2 percent reduction in its water flow, with less water lost the slower it is filled. Once the reservoir is filled, however, downriver countries could expect a worst-case scenario (where the dam is generating full electricity) of an estimated 18 percent reduction in water flow during the summer months and an estimated 54 percent increase in water flow in the winter, which could cause flooding downriver depending on how Tajikistan decides to control the timing of water release.

While dam-related variations in water flow are unlikely to become an issue in the near future, since the completion of these projects is many years off, the three downstream countries have already expressed their hostility to the projects. If the two hydroelectric power plants come closer to fruition, economic and political tensions between the upriver and downriver countries would almost certainly escalate. Uzbekistan in particular is capable of cutting off natural gas exports to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Military confrontations, while unlikely, could not be ruled out since a dramatic decline in water supplies could force the downriver countries to respond as a matter of national security. This could risk inviting retaliation from larger powers like Russia, which has extensive economic and security interests in Central Asia and wants to prevent any of the countries there, particularly Uzbekistan, from emerging as a regional hegemon.

Looking Ahead

The likelihood that Kambarata-1 or Rogun will be built is contingent on each project acquiring the foreign financing that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are seeking. If either project receives the necessary funding, Bishkek and Dushanbe are still years away from developing a substantial hydropower industry. Still, tensions in the region over water supplies will likely continue to escalate, especially if downriver countries perceive a serious and imminent threat to their water supplies.

Central Asia's Looming Conflict Over Water, Part 2: The Downriver Countries

轉載自: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/central-asias-looming-conflict-over-water-part-2-downriver-countries

Summary

Even before Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan began their recent push to build hydroelectric dams along Central Asia's two main rivers, downriver countries were coping with water scarcity challenges caused by increased demand and inefficient agricultural practices. Adjusting irrigation techniques in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan could partially mitigate these problems, but political and economic difficulties in these countries — especially the latter two — appear likely to stymie any progress. The persistence of water competition in Central Asia has already increased regional tensions and could eventually escalate to armed conflict if the situation goes unaddressed.

Shared but limited water resources are always potential catalysts for regional disputes, especially if those resources are mismanaged. However, the developing conflict involving the Aral Sea basin is unique due to its relatively recent emergence since the fall of the Soviet Union — an event that left Central Asian countries to resolve such issues on their own without mandates from Moscow for the first time in nearly a century.

Origins of the Scarcity Issue

During the Soviet era, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya rivers, which feed into the Aral Sea, were tapped for irrigation. The two rivers are sourced largely from snowmelt and glacial thaw in the mountains of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, keeping flows from the rivers' headwaters relatively consistent over the past 50 years. However, large-scale irrigation schemes geared toward cotton production have prevented water from reaching the Aral Sea, causing its volume to decrease by about 75 percent since the 1960s.

The future appears even more uncertain. Reliable environmental information about the region is difficult to acquire, since many monitoring stations fell into disrepair after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Still, there appears to be consensus that temperatures in the region are rising slightly, a change that could cause the glaciers to melt at a faster rate than previously recorded and reduce the annual average river flow by 15 percent or more by 2050.
While it is impossible to know with any certainty whether the glaciers will retreat as predicted, demand from downstream countries is projected to increase. Agriculture — the sector that consumes the most water — continues to use inefficient irrigation methods; more than 50 percent of allocated water is lost to evaporation or seepage into the ground in improperly lined irrigation canals.

Despite ongoing concerns about water scarcity, agriculture remains an important part of the economies of downstream states. Uzbekistan, in particular, depends heavily on continued cotton production. The country is one of the world's top 10 cotton exporters and the crop is one of Uzbekistan's largest sources of revenue from exports. Uzbekistan uses more water from the Aral Sea basin for irrigation than any other country in Central Asia, directing it mainly to the Fergana Valley. However, this area is particularly vulnerable to strife because its borders are arranged in a way that exacerbates the region's numerous ethnic and clan divisions — another legacy of the Soviet era. 

In Turkmenistan, the Mary clan, which dominates agriculture and the illicit drug trade along the Karakum canal, has no official role in the government, and a decline in water supply could embolden them to pressure Ashgabat. To a certain extent, all Central Asian countries deal with ethnic discord, and their stability is highly dependent on maintaining or expanding water access. Consequently, these countries have an interest in finding ways to reverse their bleak resource outlook. 

Options for Modernizing Water Use 

Regardless of whether Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are able to build their proposed hydroelectric dam projects, downriver countries will have some ability to mitigate water issues through the improvement of irrigation systems. Currently, the region's irrigation and canal systems are extremely inefficient and in need of maintenance, which has been lacking in both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Additionally, improper use of irrigation has led to increased salinity in the ground, which decreases the quality of the soil and can lower crop yields. 

Some potential irrigation improvements include lining canals and ditches with concrete or newer synthetic materials, repairing or replacing Soviet-era equipment and implementing techniques such as drip irrigation. Each of these methods could decrease water usage. Though highly unlikely given cotton's economic importance to Uzbekistan, the region could also switch from cotton to crops that require less water.


Irrigated Land in Central Asia


However, the political and economic situations in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan could prevent widespread improvement in the water distribution system. Improvements to the system would likely require both foreign funding and foreign expertise to implement. Due in part to their hydrocarbon reserves, the downriver countries are richer than Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, but they are still quite poor by Western standards. The projected costs of even a partial rehabilitation of water pumping stations, meanwhile, could be well into the hundreds of millions of dollars. At roughly $1,400 per hectare, the estimated cost of implementing drip irrigation in more than 4 million hectares of irrigated land in Uzbekistan would exceed $5 billion. Uzbekistan's annual gross domestic product was $45 billion and Turkmenistan's was $24 billion in 2011, so the countries would probably need outside assistance.

While there are several international water system initiatives in various stages of approval, including proposed projects sponsored by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, it remains unclear whether any of these projects will ever be implemented. Uzbekistan, which continues to receive Western criticism for child labor practices in its agriculture sector (among other issues), remains relatively closed to foreign investment and involvement. Some reports in the past year have indicated that China may be interested in investing in Uzbekistan, and Beijing's investment may well be more welcome than that of any Western partners.

Turkmenistan has a much smaller population to support than Uzbekistan, making improvements to its water usage system a somewhat less pressing concern. Still, the Turkmen government is likely to continue trying to appease the Mary clan in its main agricultural area to avoid prompting the kind of ethnic backlash that could jeopardize political stability.

Kazakhstan is in a slightly better position than the other two downriver countries. Because it is more open to outside assistance and has more money at its disposal, the country — in cooperation with the World Bank — has been able to launch a rehabilitation project for the Aral Sea. Under the first phase of the project, Kazakhstan completed the Kokaral dam in 2005, allowing a northern portion of the Aral Sea to be partially restored and small-scale fishing to resume. The second phase calls for the construction of another dam and the rehabilitation of other irrigation schemes along the Syr Darya.

Despite Kazakhstan's limited progress and the numerous proposed development projects of the region, comprehensive action to improve the regional irrigation situation appears to have stalled. While improvements to the efficiency of the system are possible, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, two of the three largest water users, appear unable or unwilling to pursue the kinds of measures that could mitigate a water crisis. Thus, as these countries compete for a limited and potentially shrinking resource, tensions are likely to rise and could eventually boil over into a military confrontation should the threats to their water supply become sufficiently dire.




Controversial Dam Proposals in Central Asia  

https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/controversial-dam-proposals-central-asia

Two of Central Asia's poorest countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are attempting to leverage one of their few geographic advantages — control over the headwaters of two major regional rivers — to build new hydropower dams. The proposed dams offer the prospect of boosting electricity production, which could lessen the two countries' energy dependence on their richer downstream neighbors, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The projects could eventually even allow Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to export excess energy to China, Afghanistan and Pakistan if the necessary infrastructure is built, which would be extremely valuable for the two historically poor countries. However, the new dams could also reduce water flow to the downstream countries at a time when water resources in the region are already strained due to water diversion measures, inefficient infrastructure and general overuse. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are concerned that if the dams are built, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will hoard water in reservoirs during the summer months (when the downriver agricultural regions need it most) in order to release it during the winter to generate hydroelectric power. Financing for the hydropower dams has not yet been secured, but if the projects do proceed, tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and their downriver neighbors are likely to increase. Though military confrontations are unlikely in the near term, any developments that jeopardize the downriver countries' water supply could prompt a harsh response.

2018年1月11日 星期四

阿爾及利亞: A Desert Nation Fighting to Maintain Water Supplies

Algeria: A Desert Nation Fighting to Maintain Water Supplies


Considering that the Sahara Desert covers most of Algeria, it comes as no surprise that the country is a water-scarce nation. Beyond the severity of its climate and geography, however, overexploitation is degrading Algeria's naturally available water resources to an alarming extent. To support a growing and rapidly urbanizing population, Algiers hopes to employ technological solutions to maximize the country's limited water supplies.

Desalination plants and large water conveyance projects involving tunneling, channeling and pipelines offer a potential fix, but there will be an associated increase in production costs. Water infrastructure maintenance will also become more expensive as a result. Low oil prices, coupled with the political need to maintain social spending ahead of a transition of government, are straining the Algerian budget. As a result, public-private partnerships are vital to assuring — if not improving — access to water throughout the country.

Algeria's per capita water availability is less than 300 cubic meters per year, which puts the country well below the threshold for the U.N. definition of water poverty. By comparison, Mexico's per capita water availability is roughly 3,700 cubic meters per year, and Egypt's is approximately 700 cubic meters per year.

It doesn't help that Algeria's water is unevenly distributed. Most of the country's surface water resources, in the form of rivers and lakes, are concentrated in the country's north, along with the bulk of Algeria's population. Desalination production accounted for approximately 7 percent of water consumed in 2012, but this still favors the north, which has access to the limited shoreline. Growing desalination capacity has helped increase water availability in the coastal cities, but as much as 30 percent of general supply is lost as it is distributed through Algeria's aging, leaking water transportation infrastructure. Many citizens simply do not have daily access to running water.

There is water in the sparsely populated central and southern parts of the country, but it is primarily groundwater — and it is at risk. Not only are the aquifers beneath Algeria's desert very slow to recharge, the non-renewable water drawn from them is sometimes called fossil water because it has sat undisturbed in the aquifers for millennia. As well as suffering from declining quality — increased salinity, nitrate contamination — the slowly draining aquifers have resulted in dry wells in some regions. Algerian groundwater withdrawals are roughly double the annual recharge rate: Approximately 3 billion cubic meters are withdrawn, but only 1.5 billion cubic meters are renewed each year. And the problem is spreading: Even aquifers farther north, on the Moroccan border near the Mediterranean, are showing signs of diminishing quantity and quality.




The vast Northwestern Sahara Aquifer System that lies beneath most of Algeria's interior is already showing signs of decline. Exploitation of the aquifer has increased significantly over the past several decades, and withdrawals now are estimated to be more than 2.5 billion cubic meters per year. Recharge rates, however, are only estimated at around 1 billion cubic meters per year. Unfortunately for Algeria, withdrawals from this aquifer system will only increase, contributing to the decline of water supplies and quality overall. In 2006, the government attempted to enumerate the amount of wells and boreholes in the nation's aquifer systems to get a better idea of how much water was being extracted. Algiers hopes to regulate usage more effectively, but illegal drilling — potentially in the order of tens of thousands of illegal boreholes — has made estimating and regulating water use nearly impossible. Because of overexploitation and illegal drilling, wells have to be drilled deeper, which raises the cost of access and contributes to environmental damage.


As Algeria's population grows and urbanizes, less water will be available per person. In the 1960s, Algeria's annual per capita availability was more than 1,000 cubic meters. Now it is 292 cubic meters. In contrast to availability, the volume of pumped water increased by 525 percent over the second half of the 20th century. Algeria's annual water consumption is now approximately 67 percent of its renewable resources, or about 8.4 billion cubic meters out of 11.7 billion cubic meters. By comparison, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan — both energy-producing countries with per capita GDPs comparable to Algeria's — consume 113 percent and 35 percent of their total renewable water resources respectively. Both countries also have much higher per capita water availability than Algeria does.

Algeria's Expensive Water Strategy

Algiers' water management strategy focuses on making the most of existing water resources through redistribution, increased storage capacity and enhanced desalination capacity. The Algerian water distribution network stretches more than 58,000 kilometers (roughly 36,000 miles) and can move over 3 billion cubic meters of water per year. In terms of storage, there are already more than 70 large dams in Algeria, but increasing storage capacity is an important part of the capital's water strategy. When it comes to desalination production capacity, growth has skyrocketed from less than 50,000 cubic meters per day in 2002 to more than 2 million cubic meters per day in 2015. The Magtaa plant, which began operations in 2014, has a capacity of half a million cubic meters per day — enough to provide adequate drinking water for 5 million citizens. There are plans to expand desalination capacity for seawater and brackish groundwater in the near future.

For a country with some of the lowest water prices in the region, Algeria relies heavily on expensive water management solutions. Even with recent revisions to the water pricing system, the cost of water is so low that it does not encourage conservation. In fact, prices do not even cover production and maintenance costs, let alone treatment of wastewater. Moving a comparatively heavily liquid such as water from its point of origin to point of consumption entails significant costs, both for the initial construction of the infrastructure and for operations and maintenance thereafter. A large-scale transfer project to move water from Ain Salah to Tamanrasset (completed in 2011) cost roughly $2.5 billion, not including the ongoing operation and maintenance expenses. Desalination operations are even more energy intensive and costly than water conveyance. Water produced at desalination plants in the Arab region costs between 50 cents and 60 cents per cubic meter — compared to around 5 cents per cubic meter for groundwater, and 20-50 cents per cubic meter for surface water. Although energy is a factor in the higher price of water from desalination plants, more than half of the cost is attributed to factors other than energy, such as labor and chemicals.

Without investment from the government — not just in big nameplate projects but also in routine maintenance and efforts to improve efficiency and regulation — the availability and quality of Algeria's water supply will keep declining. However, the government cannot foot the bill alone. Private investment will be necessary to safeguard the country's water supply. Public-private partnerships in the water sector are partly responsible for the recent surge in desalination capacity. In addition, private organizations are responsible for water management in some of the country's largest cities, including Algiers, Annaba, Oran and Constantine.

Algeria's 2015-2019 Development Plan earmarked nearly $18 billion for water infrastructure projects. But throughout 2015 and into 2016, low oil prices have put a burden on the government's budget. Algiers' top spending priority will be security services, especially for energy assets. Furthermore, the country has a history of using social spending to quell civil unrest. President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika used public spending campaigns to fend off protests after the Arab Spring brought down other leaders in the region. Even with low oil prices straining Algiers' finances, the government is more likely to spend its reserves on subsidies than risk unrest. Whatever government takes power following the upcoming transition, it will likely continue with that strategy because Algiers and the populace remain wary of political unrest, a legacy of the country's decadelong civil war (1991-2002).

Water's Role in Algeria's Future

Because oil prices are expected to remain low for a while, Algiers is searching for new sources of revenue. Algeria's vast potential shale reserves are one such source. However, water security was a common theme during recent protests regarding shale extraction, and concerns about water scarcity could hinder the development of Algerian shale over the next five to seven years. Technological solutions that limit or eliminate water's role in hydraulic fracturing could allow Algeria to exploit its shale reserves in the long term, although given the protest culture of the country and region, demonstrations against hydraulic fracturing could still occur even if water use is addressed.

There is little doubt that water is part of a circle of causation and control: It remains a key factor in keeping Algeria's security situation manageable, which is vital to keeping the country attractive to foreign investment, which in turn is crucial to maintaining the water supply. The protest culture in Algeria means that subsidies that benefit the population cannot be rolled back easily. Therefore, water prices will remain low and foreign investment will still be needed to maintain or improve Algerians' access to water.

Climate changes — specifically, higher temperatures and less rain — are predicted for the coming decades in Algeria and the wider region. At the same time, the population is expanding and urbanizing, consuming more water than ever before. This adds to the stress on the country's already scarce water resources. Greater desalination capacity, improvements to existing infrastructure and additional water conveyance projects — created through cooperation between the public and private sectors — could alleviate some supply concerns, especially in urban areas. But, if short-term budgetary problems lead Algiers to neglect the country's water infrastructure, the longer-term implications are dire. Declining quality, infrequent availability or more dependence on expensive water from desalination plants will contribute to the potential for social unrest. As overexploitation creates more obvious environmental degradation and further reduces water supplies, dissent will become a greater threat to the government.

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Algeria's Expensive Water Problem  

轉載自:  https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/algerias-expensive-water-problem




Algeria's per capita water availability is less than 300 cubic meters per year, which is well below the threshold for the U.N. definition of water poverty. Many citizens simply do not have daily access to running water. The country's water is also unevenly distributed, with most of its surface water resources concentrated in the north, along with the bulk of its population.

There is water in the sparsely populated central and southern parts of the country, but it is primarily groundwater — and it is at risk. Not only are the aquifers beneath Algeria's desert very slow to recharge, the non-renewable water drawn from them is sometimes called fossil water because it has sat undisturbed in the aquifers for millennia. Algerian groundwater withdrawals are roughly double the annual recharge rate, and the problem is spreading: Even aquifers farther north are showing signs of diminishing quantity and quality.

Algiers' water management strategy focuses on making the most of existing water resources through redistribution, increased storage capacity and enhanced desalination capacity. But for a country with some of the lowest water prices in the region, Algeria relies heavily on expensive water management solutions. Without government investment, the availability and quality of Algeria's water supply will continue to decline. However, the government cannot foot the bill alone — private investment will be necessary to safeguard the country's water supply.

Climate changes — specifically, higher temperatures and less rain — are predicted for the coming decades in Algeria and the wider region. At the same time, the population is expanding and urbanizing, consuming more water than ever before. Greater desalination capacity, improvements to existing infrastructure and additional water conveyance projects — created through cooperation between the public and private sectors — could alleviate some supply concerns, especially in urban areas. But, if short-term budgetary problems lead Algiers to neglect the country's water infrastructure, the longer-term implications are dire. Declining quality, infrequent availability or more dependence on expensive water from desalination plants will contribute to the potential for social unrest.