Two
of Central Asia's poorest countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are
attempting to leverage one of their few geographic advantages — control
over the headwaters of two major regional rivers — to build new
hydropower dams. The proposed dams, which were originally drawn up by
the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s, offer the prospect of boosting
electricity production both for domestic use and potentially for export
to neighboring states. Financing for the dams has not yet been
secured, though Russia has periodically offered some assistance to each
country. However, if the projects do proceed, the already tense
relations are likely to become even more fraught between Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan and their richer downriver neighbors, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan,
which depend on the rivers' waters. While military confrontations are
unlikely in the near term, any developments that jeopardize the
downriver countries' water supply could prompt a harsh response.
Under
the Soviet Union, Central Asia was split into five Soviet republics.
All administrative matters in these republics were decided by Moscow,
including how the individual republics used and distributed their
natural resources. When the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991, the
former republics (now independent states) kept their Soviet-imposed borders,
even though they were explicitly designed by Moscow to keep any one
state from becoming powerful or independent enough to challenge the
Kremlin's central authority. Consequently, these countries are dependent
on one another for their natural resources and energy needs, which is a
challenge now that each individual country, rather than Moscow, is
responsible for managing those resources.
Resource Competition in Central Asia
Portions
of the Central Asian steppe — especially Uzbekistan — were endowed with
fertile soil and favorable weather patterns, making them well suited
for agriculture, though the arid land requires irrigation. To create
agricultural zones and provide sufficient water for other uses in
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, the Soviet Union constructed
extensive irrigation networks to redirect water from Central Asia's two
largest rivers, the Syr Darya originating in Tajikistan and the Amu
Darya originating in Kyrgyzstan. Water
diversion measures combined with inefficient infrastructure and general
overuse have caused the rivers' drainage point, the Aral Sea, to lose
about 75 percent of its water volume since the 1960s and become
increasingly saline. This has reduced the sea's ability to provide a
moderating effect on temperatures and has resulted in the
desertification of the surrounding areas. Considering the increasing
demand on and the possible reduction of the rivers' glacial sources, the
already-strained water situation in the region looks set to grow tenser
in the coming years. This is the context under which Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan hope to build two new hydropower plants that could
further reduce the water flow to downriver countries. Bishkek and
Dushanbe want the power plants to expand their electrical production
capacity, which could lessen their energy dependence on downstream
countries, especially natural gas from Uzbekistan. These projects could
eventually even allow the countries to export excess energy to China,
Afghanistan and Pakistan if the necessary infrastructure is built, which
would be extremely valuable for the two historically poor countries.
Proposed Hydroelectric Projects
Kyrgyzstan's
proposed Kambarata-1 hydropower plant would be built on the Naryn
River, a tributary of the Syr Darya, while Tajikistan's proposed Rogun
hydropower plant would be built on the Vakhsh River, a tributary of the
Amu Darya. These are two of the largest hydroelectric projects ever
planned in Central Asia, with potential generating capacities of 1,900
megawatts and 3,600 megawatts, respectively. Kambarata-1 and Rogun
were designed by the Soviets to improve water management in Central
Asia. Two significant sources of the region's river water are snowmelt
and glacial thaw, and thus the flow slows in the winter months while
becoming more rapid when temperatures heat up in the summer. Kambarata-1
and Rogun are designed to be able to better control the fluctuation of
water flow by retaining water in reservoirs and releasing it when it is
most needed. But this introduces competing goals for reservoir use:
While the downriver areas need more water in the summer to irrigate
their crops, the upriver regions require more water in the winter to
generate hydroelectricity. Both proposed dam projects have
received external funding to carry out feasibility studies, but the
estimated high costs of the dams make it impossible for Dushanbe and
Bishkek to pay for them on their own. Kambarata-1 will cost an estimated
$2-4 billion, while Rogun is projected at $2-3 billion. Considering
Kyrgystan's gross domestic product was $5.9 billion in 2011 and
Tajikistan's was $6.5 billion, foreign investment will be essential for
the projects. Russia has proposed creating a joint-stock company with
Kyrgyzstan to build Kambarata-1 and also paid for its feasibility study.
But while Kyrgyz President Almaz Atambayev said construction would
begin by spring 2013, the funding needed to begin, much less complete,
the project has yet to materialize.
In
the past, Russia has backed out on promises to fund such projects in
Central Asia. At the end of 2004, Russian aluminum company RUSAL
expressed interest in finishing construction of Tajikistan's Rogun
hydropower plant, which the Soviets had begun in 1976 but never
completed. RUSAL pulled out of the project, ostensibly over
disagreements regarding the design of the dam and how much electricity
should be allocated for residential versus industrial use. The actual
reason for the withdrawal, however, was that Russia did not want to seriously provoke Uzbekistan by building a hydropower plant of such size. Since
then, however, the project has been revived. Projected to become the
world's tallest dam if it is built to Tajikistan's specifications, Rogun
is currently undergoing its second feasibility study, funded by the
World Bank. The Tajik government raised less than $200 million for the
project by forcing citizens to buy shares in it. But the rest of the $2
billion needed to build the project will likely have to come from
foreign investment. Whether the funding for either dam comes from Russia
will likely depend on how far the Kremlin feels it can push Uzbekistan
rather than how interested it is in being a stakeholder in these two
hydroelectric power plants. While neither project will likely be
completed in the near future, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan
have all expressed their concerns about how these new hydropower dams
could affect them. These countries are worried that if the dams are
built, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will hoard water in reservoirs during
the summer months (when the downriver agricultural regions need it most)
so the upriver countries can release it in the winter to generate
hydroelectric power. If the Rogun dam were to be built, it could
affect the Vakhsh River's water flow — but this impact would likely not
be felt for years. Some estimates indicate it could take more than a
decade to fill Rogun's reservoir, during which time the river would
probably only experience an estimated 1-2 percent reduction in its water
flow, with less water lost the slower it is filled. Once the reservoir
is filled, however, downriver countries could expect a worst-case
scenario (where the dam is generating full electricity) of an estimated
18 percent reduction in water flow during the summer months and an
estimated 54 percent increase in water flow in the winter, which could
cause flooding downriver depending on how Tajikistan decides to control
the timing of water release. While dam-related variations in water
flow are unlikely to become an issue in the near future, since the
completion of these projects is many years off, the three downstream
countries have already expressed their hostility to the projects. If the
two hydroelectric power plants come closer to fruition, economic and
political tensions between the upriver and downriver countries would
almost certainly escalate. Uzbekistan in particular is capable of
cutting off natural gas exports to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Military
confrontations, while unlikely, could not be ruled out since a dramatic
decline in water supplies could force the downriver countries to respond
as a matter of national security. This could risk inviting retaliation
from larger powers like Russia, which has extensive economic and
security interests in Central Asia and wants to prevent any of the
countries there, particularly Uzbekistan, from emerging as a regional
hegemon.
Looking Ahead
The likelihood that Kambarata-1 or
Rogun will be built is contingent on each project acquiring the foreign
financing that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are seeking. If either project
receives the necessary funding, Bishkek and Dushanbe are still years
away from developing a substantial hydropower industry. Still, tensions
in the region over water supplies will likely continue to escalate,
especially if downriver countries perceive a serious and imminent threat
to their water supplies.
Central Asia's Looming Conflict Over Water, Part 2: The Downriver Countries
Even before Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan began their recent push to build hydroelectric dams along Central Asia's two main rivers, downriver countries were coping with water scarcity challenges caused by increased demand and inefficient agricultural practices. Adjusting irrigation techniques in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan could partially mitigate these problems, but political and economic difficulties in these countries — especially the latter two — appear likely to stymie any progress. The persistence of water competition in Central Asia has already increased regional tensions and could eventually escalate to armed conflict if the situation goes unaddressed.
Shared but limited water resources are always potential catalysts for regional disputes, especially if those resources are mismanaged. However, the developing conflict involving the Aral Sea basin is unique due to its relatively recent emergence since the fall of the Soviet Union — an event that left Central Asian countries to resolve such issues on their own without mandates from Moscow for the first time in nearly a century.
Origins of the Scarcity Issue
During the Soviet era, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya rivers, which feed into the Aral Sea, were tapped for irrigation. The two rivers are sourced largely from snowmelt and glacial thaw in the mountains of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, keeping flows from the rivers' headwaters relatively consistent over the past 50 years. However, large-scale irrigation schemes geared toward cotton production have prevented water from reaching the Aral Sea, causing its volume to decrease by about 75 percent since the 1960s. The future appears even more uncertain. Reliable environmental information about the region is difficult to acquire, since many monitoring stations fell into disrepair after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Still, there appears to be consensus that temperatures in the region are rising slightly, a change that could cause the glaciers to melt at a faster rate than previously recorded and reduce the annual average river flow by 15 percent or more by 2050. While it is impossible to know with any certainty whether the glaciers will retreat as predicted, demand from downstream countries is projected to increase. Agriculture — the sector that consumes the most water — continues to use inefficient irrigation methods; more than 50 percent of allocated water is lost to evaporation or seepage into the ground in improperly lined irrigation canals. Despite ongoing concerns about water scarcity, agriculture remains an important part of the economies of downstream states. Uzbekistan, in particular, depends heavily on continued cotton production. The country is one of the world's top 10 cotton exporters and the crop is one of Uzbekistan's largest sources of revenue from exports. Uzbekistan uses more water from the Aral Sea basin for irrigation than any other country in Central Asia, directing it mainly to the Fergana Valley. However, this area is particularly vulnerable to strife because its borders are arranged in a way that exacerbates the region's numerous ethnic and clan divisions — another legacy of the Soviet era. In Turkmenistan, the Mary clan, which dominates agriculture and the illicit drug trade along the Karakum canal, has no official role in the government, and a decline in water supply could embolden them to pressure Ashgabat. To a certain extent, all Central Asian countries deal with ethnic discord, and their stability is highly dependent on maintaining or expanding water access. Consequently, these countries have an interest in finding ways to reverse their bleak resource outlook. Options for Modernizing Water Use Regardless of whether Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are able to build their proposed hydroelectric dam projects, downriver countries will have some ability to mitigate water issues through the improvement of irrigation systems. Currently, the region's irrigation and canal systems are extremely inefficient and in need of maintenance, which has been lacking in both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Additionally, improper use of irrigation has led to increased salinity in the ground, which decreases the quality of the soil and can lower crop yields. Some potential irrigation improvements include lining canals and ditches with concrete or newer synthetic materials, repairing or replacing Soviet-era equipment and implementing techniques such as drip irrigation. Each of these methods could decrease water usage. Though highly unlikely given cotton's economic importance to Uzbekistan, the region could also switch from cotton to crops that require less water.
Irrigated Land in Central Asia
However, the political and economic situations in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan could prevent widespread improvement in the water distribution system. Improvements to the system would likely require both foreign funding and foreign expertise to implement. Due in part to their hydrocarbon reserves, the downriver countries are richer than Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, but they are still quite poor by Western standards. The projected costs of even a partial rehabilitation of water pumping stations, meanwhile, could be well into the hundreds of millions of dollars. At roughly $1,400 per hectare, the estimated cost of implementing drip irrigation in more than 4 million hectares of irrigated land in Uzbekistan would exceed $5 billion. Uzbekistan's annual gross domestic product was $45 billion and Turkmenistan's was $24 billion in 2011, so the countries would probably need outside assistance. While there are several international water system initiatives in various stages of approval, including proposed projects sponsored by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, it remains unclear whether any of these projects will ever be implemented. Uzbekistan, which continues to receive Western criticism for child labor practices in its agriculture sector (among other issues), remains relatively closed to foreign investment and involvement. Some reports in the past year have indicated that China may be interested in investing in Uzbekistan, and Beijing's investment may well be more welcome than that of any Western partners. Turkmenistan has a much smaller population to support than Uzbekistan, making improvements to its water usage system a somewhat less pressing concern. Still, the Turkmen government is likely to continue trying to appease the Mary clan in its main agricultural area to avoid prompting the kind of ethnic backlash that could jeopardize political stability. Kazakhstan is in a slightly better position than the other two downriver countries. Because it is more open to outside assistance and has more money at its disposal, the country — in cooperation with the World Bank — has been able to launch a rehabilitation project for the Aral Sea. Under the first phase of the project, Kazakhstan completed the Kokaral dam in 2005, allowing a northern portion of the Aral Sea to be partially restored and small-scale fishing to resume. The second phase calls for the construction of another dam and the rehabilitation of other irrigation schemes along the Syr Darya. Despite Kazakhstan's limited progress and the numerous proposed development projects of the region, comprehensive action to improve the regional irrigation situation appears to have stalled. While improvements to the efficiency of the system are possible, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, two of the three largest water users, appear unable or unwilling to pursue the kinds of measures that could mitigate a water crisis. Thus, as these countries compete for a limited and potentially shrinking resource, tensions are likely to rise and could eventually boil over into a military confrontation should the threats to their water supply become sufficiently dire.
Two
of Central Asia's poorest countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are
attempting to leverage one of their few geographic advantages — control
over the headwaters of two major regional rivers — to build new hydropower dams.
The proposed dams offer the prospect of boosting electricity
production, which could lessen the two countries' energy dependence on
their richer downstream neighbors, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan. The projects could eventually even allow Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan to export excess energy to China, Afghanistan and Pakistan if
the necessary infrastructure is built, which would be extremely
valuable for the two historically poor countries. However, the new dams
could also reduce water flow to the downstream countries at a time when
water resources in the region are already strained due to water
diversion measures, inefficient infrastructure and general overuse.
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are concerned that if the dams
are built, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will hoard water in reservoirs
during the summer months (when the downriver agricultural regions need
it most) in order to release it during the winter to generate
hydroelectric power. Financing for the hydropower dams has not yet been
secured, but if the projects do proceed, tensions between Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan and their downriver neighbors are likely to increase. Though
military confrontations are unlikely in the near term, any developments
that jeopardize the downriver countries' water supply could prompt a
harsh response.
