Two
of Central Asia's poorest countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are
attempting to leverage one of their few geographic advantages — control
over the headwaters of two major regional rivers — to build new
hydropower dams. The proposed dams, which were originally drawn up by
the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s, offer the prospect of boosting
electricity production both for domestic use and potentially for export
to neighboring states. Financing for the dams has not yet been
secured, though Russia has periodically offered some assistance to each
country. However, if the projects do proceed, the already tense
relations are likely to become even more fraught between Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan and their richer downriver neighbors, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan,
which depend on the rivers' waters. While military confrontations are
unlikely in the near term, any developments that jeopardize the
downriver countries' water supply could prompt a harsh response.
Under
the Soviet Union, Central Asia was split into five Soviet republics.
All administrative matters in these republics were decided by Moscow,
including how the individual republics used and distributed their
natural resources. When the Soviet Union dissolved in December 1991, the
former republics (now independent states) kept their Soviet-imposed borders,
even though they were explicitly designed by Moscow to keep any one
state from becoming powerful or independent enough to challenge the
Kremlin's central authority. Consequently, these countries are dependent
on one another for their natural resources and energy needs, which is a
challenge now that each individual country, rather than Moscow, is
responsible for managing those resources.
Resource Competition in Central Asia
Portions
of the Central Asian steppe — especially Uzbekistan — were endowed with
fertile soil and favorable weather patterns, making them well suited
for agriculture, though the arid land requires irrigation. To create
agricultural zones and provide sufficient water for other uses in
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, the Soviet Union constructed
extensive irrigation networks to redirect water from Central Asia's two
largest rivers, the Syr Darya originating in Tajikistan and the Amu
Darya originating in Kyrgyzstan. Water
diversion measures combined with inefficient infrastructure and general
overuse have caused the rivers' drainage point, the Aral Sea, to lose
about 75 percent of its water volume since the 1960s and become
increasingly saline. This has reduced the sea's ability to provide a
moderating effect on temperatures and has resulted in the
desertification of the surrounding areas. Considering the increasing
demand on and the possible reduction of the rivers' glacial sources, the
already-strained water situation in the region looks set to grow tenser
in the coming years. This is the context under which Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan hope to build two new hydropower plants that could
further reduce the water flow to downriver countries. Bishkek and
Dushanbe want the power plants to expand their electrical production
capacity, which could lessen their energy dependence on downstream
countries, especially natural gas from Uzbekistan. These projects could
eventually even allow the countries to export excess energy to China,
Afghanistan and Pakistan if the necessary infrastructure is built, which
would be extremely valuable for the two historically poor countries.
Proposed Hydroelectric Projects
Kyrgyzstan's
proposed Kambarata-1 hydropower plant would be built on the Naryn
River, a tributary of the Syr Darya, while Tajikistan's proposed Rogun
hydropower plant would be built on the Vakhsh River, a tributary of the
Amu Darya. These are two of the largest hydroelectric projects ever
planned in Central Asia, with potential generating capacities of 1,900
megawatts and 3,600 megawatts, respectively. Kambarata-1 and Rogun
were designed by the Soviets to improve water management in Central
Asia. Two significant sources of the region's river water are snowmelt
and glacial thaw, and thus the flow slows in the winter months while
becoming more rapid when temperatures heat up in the summer. Kambarata-1
and Rogun are designed to be able to better control the fluctuation of
water flow by retaining water in reservoirs and releasing it when it is
most needed. But this introduces competing goals for reservoir use:
While the downriver areas need more water in the summer to irrigate
their crops, the upriver regions require more water in the winter to
generate hydroelectricity. Both proposed dam projects have
received external funding to carry out feasibility studies, but the
estimated high costs of the dams make it impossible for Dushanbe and
Bishkek to pay for them on their own. Kambarata-1 will cost an estimated
$2-4 billion, while Rogun is projected at $2-3 billion. Considering
Kyrgystan's gross domestic product was $5.9 billion in 2011 and
Tajikistan's was $6.5 billion, foreign investment will be essential for
the projects. Russia has proposed creating a joint-stock company with
Kyrgyzstan to build Kambarata-1 and also paid for its feasibility study.
But while Kyrgyz President Almaz Atambayev said construction would
begin by spring 2013, the funding needed to begin, much less complete,
the project has yet to materialize.
In
the past, Russia has backed out on promises to fund such projects in
Central Asia. At the end of 2004, Russian aluminum company RUSAL
expressed interest in finishing construction of Tajikistan's Rogun
hydropower plant, which the Soviets had begun in 1976 but never
completed. RUSAL pulled out of the project, ostensibly over
disagreements regarding the design of the dam and how much electricity
should be allocated for residential versus industrial use. The actual
reason for the withdrawal, however, was that Russia did not want to seriously provoke Uzbekistan by building a hydropower plant of such size. Since
then, however, the project has been revived. Projected to become the
world's tallest dam if it is built to Tajikistan's specifications, Rogun
is currently undergoing its second feasibility study, funded by the
World Bank. The Tajik government raised less than $200 million for the
project by forcing citizens to buy shares in it. But the rest of the $2
billion needed to build the project will likely have to come from
foreign investment. Whether the funding for either dam comes from Russia
will likely depend on how far the Kremlin feels it can push Uzbekistan
rather than how interested it is in being a stakeholder in these two
hydroelectric power plants. While neither project will likely be
completed in the near future, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan
have all expressed their concerns about how these new hydropower dams
could affect them. These countries are worried that if the dams are
built, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will hoard water in reservoirs during
the summer months (when the downriver agricultural regions need it most)
so the upriver countries can release it in the winter to generate
hydroelectric power. If the Rogun dam were to be built, it could
affect the Vakhsh River's water flow — but this impact would likely not
be felt for years. Some estimates indicate it could take more than a
decade to fill Rogun's reservoir, during which time the river would
probably only experience an estimated 1-2 percent reduction in its water
flow, with less water lost the slower it is filled. Once the reservoir
is filled, however, downriver countries could expect a worst-case
scenario (where the dam is generating full electricity) of an estimated
18 percent reduction in water flow during the summer months and an
estimated 54 percent increase in water flow in the winter, which could
cause flooding downriver depending on how Tajikistan decides to control
the timing of water release. While dam-related variations in water
flow are unlikely to become an issue in the near future, since the
completion of these projects is many years off, the three downstream
countries have already expressed their hostility to the projects. If the
two hydroelectric power plants come closer to fruition, economic and
political tensions between the upriver and downriver countries would
almost certainly escalate. Uzbekistan in particular is capable of
cutting off natural gas exports to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Military
confrontations, while unlikely, could not be ruled out since a dramatic
decline in water supplies could force the downriver countries to respond
as a matter of national security. This could risk inviting retaliation
from larger powers like Russia, which has extensive economic and
security interests in Central Asia and wants to prevent any of the
countries there, particularly Uzbekistan, from emerging as a regional
hegemon.
Looking Ahead
The likelihood that Kambarata-1 or
Rogun will be built is contingent on each project acquiring the foreign
financing that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are seeking. If either project
receives the necessary funding, Bishkek and Dushanbe are still years
away from developing a substantial hydropower industry. Still, tensions
in the region over water supplies will likely continue to escalate,
especially if downriver countries perceive a serious and imminent threat
to their water supplies.
Central Asia's Looming Conflict Over Water, Part 2: The Downriver Countries
Even before Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan began their recent push to build hydroelectric dams along Central Asia's two main rivers, downriver countries were coping with water scarcity challenges caused by increased demand and inefficient agricultural practices. Adjusting irrigation techniques in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan could partially mitigate these problems, but political and economic difficulties in these countries — especially the latter two — appear likely to stymie any progress. The persistence of water competition in Central Asia has already increased regional tensions and could eventually escalate to armed conflict if the situation goes unaddressed.
Shared but limited water resources are always potential catalysts for regional disputes, especially if those resources are mismanaged. However, the developing conflict involving the Aral Sea basin is unique due to its relatively recent emergence since the fall of the Soviet Union — an event that left Central Asian countries to resolve such issues on their own without mandates from Moscow for the first time in nearly a century.
Origins of the Scarcity Issue
During the Soviet era, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya rivers, which feed into the Aral Sea, were tapped for irrigation. The two rivers are sourced largely from snowmelt and glacial thaw in the mountains of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, keeping flows from the rivers' headwaters relatively consistent over the past 50 years. However, large-scale irrigation schemes geared toward cotton production have prevented water from reaching the Aral Sea, causing its volume to decrease by about 75 percent since the 1960s. The future appears even more uncertain. Reliable environmental information about the region is difficult to acquire, since many monitoring stations fell into disrepair after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Still, there appears to be consensus that temperatures in the region are rising slightly, a change that could cause the glaciers to melt at a faster rate than previously recorded and reduce the annual average river flow by 15 percent or more by 2050. While it is impossible to know with any certainty whether the glaciers will retreat as predicted, demand from downstream countries is projected to increase. Agriculture — the sector that consumes the most water — continues to use inefficient irrigation methods; more than 50 percent of allocated water is lost to evaporation or seepage into the ground in improperly lined irrigation canals. Despite ongoing concerns about water scarcity, agriculture remains an important part of the economies of downstream states. Uzbekistan, in particular, depends heavily on continued cotton production. The country is one of the world's top 10 cotton exporters and the crop is one of Uzbekistan's largest sources of revenue from exports. Uzbekistan uses more water from the Aral Sea basin for irrigation than any other country in Central Asia, directing it mainly to the Fergana Valley. However, this area is particularly vulnerable to strife because its borders are arranged in a way that exacerbates the region's numerous ethnic and clan divisions — another legacy of the Soviet era. In Turkmenistan, the Mary clan, which dominates agriculture and the illicit drug trade along the Karakum canal, has no official role in the government, and a decline in water supply could embolden them to pressure Ashgabat. To a certain extent, all Central Asian countries deal with ethnic discord, and their stability is highly dependent on maintaining or expanding water access. Consequently, these countries have an interest in finding ways to reverse their bleak resource outlook. Options for Modernizing Water Use Regardless of whether Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are able to build their proposed hydroelectric dam projects, downriver countries will have some ability to mitigate water issues through the improvement of irrigation systems. Currently, the region's irrigation and canal systems are extremely inefficient and in need of maintenance, which has been lacking in both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Additionally, improper use of irrigation has led to increased salinity in the ground, which decreases the quality of the soil and can lower crop yields. Some potential irrigation improvements include lining canals and ditches with concrete or newer synthetic materials, repairing or replacing Soviet-era equipment and implementing techniques such as drip irrigation. Each of these methods could decrease water usage. Though highly unlikely given cotton's economic importance to Uzbekistan, the region could also switch from cotton to crops that require less water.
Irrigated Land in Central Asia
However, the political and economic situations in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan could prevent widespread improvement in the water distribution system. Improvements to the system would likely require both foreign funding and foreign expertise to implement. Due in part to their hydrocarbon reserves, the downriver countries are richer than Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, but they are still quite poor by Western standards. The projected costs of even a partial rehabilitation of water pumping stations, meanwhile, could be well into the hundreds of millions of dollars. At roughly $1,400 per hectare, the estimated cost of implementing drip irrigation in more than 4 million hectares of irrigated land in Uzbekistan would exceed $5 billion. Uzbekistan's annual gross domestic product was $45 billion and Turkmenistan's was $24 billion in 2011, so the countries would probably need outside assistance. While there are several international water system initiatives in various stages of approval, including proposed projects sponsored by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, it remains unclear whether any of these projects will ever be implemented. Uzbekistan, which continues to receive Western criticism for child labor practices in its agriculture sector (among other issues), remains relatively closed to foreign investment and involvement. Some reports in the past year have indicated that China may be interested in investing in Uzbekistan, and Beijing's investment may well be more welcome than that of any Western partners. Turkmenistan has a much smaller population to support than Uzbekistan, making improvements to its water usage system a somewhat less pressing concern. Still, the Turkmen government is likely to continue trying to appease the Mary clan in its main agricultural area to avoid prompting the kind of ethnic backlash that could jeopardize political stability. Kazakhstan is in a slightly better position than the other two downriver countries. Because it is more open to outside assistance and has more money at its disposal, the country — in cooperation with the World Bank — has been able to launch a rehabilitation project for the Aral Sea. Under the first phase of the project, Kazakhstan completed the Kokaral dam in 2005, allowing a northern portion of the Aral Sea to be partially restored and small-scale fishing to resume. The second phase calls for the construction of another dam and the rehabilitation of other irrigation schemes along the Syr Darya. Despite Kazakhstan's limited progress and the numerous proposed development projects of the region, comprehensive action to improve the regional irrigation situation appears to have stalled. While improvements to the efficiency of the system are possible, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, two of the three largest water users, appear unable or unwilling to pursue the kinds of measures that could mitigate a water crisis. Thus, as these countries compete for a limited and potentially shrinking resource, tensions are likely to rise and could eventually boil over into a military confrontation should the threats to their water supply become sufficiently dire.
Two
of Central Asia's poorest countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are
attempting to leverage one of their few geographic advantages — control
over the headwaters of two major regional rivers — to build new hydropower dams.
The proposed dams offer the prospect of boosting electricity
production, which could lessen the two countries' energy dependence on
their richer downstream neighbors, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan. The projects could eventually even allow Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan to export excess energy to China, Afghanistan and Pakistan if
the necessary infrastructure is built, which would be extremely
valuable for the two historically poor countries. However, the new dams
could also reduce water flow to the downstream countries at a time when
water resources in the region are already strained due to water
diversion measures, inefficient infrastructure and general overuse.
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are concerned that if the dams
are built, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will hoard water in reservoirs
during the summer months (when the downriver agricultural regions need
it most) in order to release it during the winter to generate
hydroelectric power. Financing for the hydropower dams has not yet been
secured, but if the projects do proceed, tensions between Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan and their downriver neighbors are likely to increase. Though
military confrontations are unlikely in the near term, any developments
that jeopardize the downriver countries' water supply could prompt a
harsh response.
Considering that the Sahara Desert covers most
of Algeria, it comes as no surprise that the country is a water-scarce nation.
Beyond the severity of its climate and geography, however, overexploitation is
degrading Algeria's naturally available water resources to an alarming extent.
To support a growing and rapidly urbanizing population, Algiers hopes to employ
technological solutions to maximize the country's limited water
supplies.
Desalination plants and large water
conveyance projects involving tunneling, channeling and pipelines offer a
potential fix, but there will be an associated increase in production
costs. Water infrastructure maintenance will also become more expensive as a
result. Low oil prices, coupled with the political need to maintain social
spending ahead of a transition of government, are straining the Algerian budget.
As a result, public-private partnerships are vital to assuring — if not
improving — access to water throughout the country.
Algeria's per capita water availability is less
than 300 cubic meters per year, which puts the country well below the threshold
for the U.N. definition of water poverty. By comparison,Mexico'sper capita water availability is roughly 3,700
cubic meters per year, andEgypt'sis
approximately 700 cubic meters per year.
It doesn't help that Algeria's water is
unevenly distributed. Most of the country's surface water resources, in the form
of rivers and lakes, are concentrated in the country's north, along with the
bulk of Algeria's population. Desalination production accounted for
approximately 7 percent of water consumed in 2012, but this still favors the
north, which has access to the limited shoreline. Growing desalination capacity
has helped increase water availability in the coastal cities, but as much as 30
percent of general supply is lost as it is distributed through Algeria's aging,
leaking water transportation infrastructure. Many citizens simply do not have
daily access to running water.
There is water in the sparsely populated
central and southern parts of the country, but it is primarily groundwater — and
it is at risk. Not only are the aquifers beneath Algeria's desert very slow to
recharge, the non-renewable water drawn from them is sometimes called fossil
water because it has sat undisturbed in the aquifers for millennia. As well as
suffering from declining quality — increased salinity, nitrate contamination —
the slowly draining aquifers have resulted in dry wells in some regions.
Algerian groundwater withdrawals are roughly double the annual recharge rate:
Approximately 3 billion cubic meters are withdrawn, but only 1.5 billion cubic
meters are renewed each year. And the problem is spreading: Even aquifers
farther north, on the Moroccan border near the Mediterranean, are showing signs
of diminishing quantity and quality.
The vast
Northwestern Sahara Aquifer System that lies beneath most of Algeria's interior
is already showing signs of decline. Exploitation of the aquifer has increased
significantly over the past several decades, and withdrawals now are estimated
to be more than 2.5 billion cubic meters per year. Recharge rates, however, are
only estimated at around 1 billion cubic meters per year. Unfortunately for
Algeria, withdrawals from this aquifer system will only increase, contributing
to the decline of water supplies and quality overall. In 2006, the government
attempted to enumerate the amount of wells and boreholes in the nation's aquifer
systems to get a better idea of how much water was being extracted. Algiers
hopes to regulate usage more effectively, but illegal drilling — potentially in
the order of tens of thousands of illegal boreholes — has made estimating
and regulating water use nearly impossible. Because of overexploitation and
illegal drilling, wells have to be drilled deeper, which raises the cost of
access and contributes to environmental damage.
As Algeria's population grows and urbanizes,
less water will be available per person. In the 1960s, Algeria's annual per
capita availability was more than 1,000 cubic meters. Now it is 292 cubic
meters. In contrast to availability, the volume of pumped water increased
by 525 percent over the second half of the 20th century. Algeria's annual water
consumption is now approximately 67 percent of its renewable resources, or about
8.4 billion cubic meters out of 11.7 billion cubic meters. By
comparison, Turkmenistanand Azerbaijan — both energy-producing countries
with per capita GDPs comparable to Algeria's — consume 113 percent and 35
percent of their total renewable water resources respectively. Both countries
also have much higher per capita water availability than Algeria
does.
Algeria's Expensive Water Strategy
Algiers' water management strategy focuses on
making the most of existing water resources through redistribution, increased
storage capacity and enhanced desalination capacity. The Algerian water
distribution network stretches more than 58,000 kilometers (roughly 36,000
miles) and can move over 3 billion cubic meters of water per year. In terms of
storage, there are already more than 70 large dams in Algeria, but increasing
storage capacity is an important part of the capital's water strategy. When it
comes to desalination production capacity, growth has skyrocketed from less than
50,000 cubic meters per day in 2002 to more than 2 million cubic meters per day
in 2015. The Magtaa plant, which began operations in 2014, has a capacity of
half a million cubic meters per day — enough to provide adequate drinking water
for 5 million citizens. There are plans to expand desalination capacity for
seawater and brackish groundwater in the near future.
For a country with some of the lowest water
prices in the region, Algeria relies heavily on expensive water management
solutions. Even with recent revisions to the water pricing system, the cost of
water is so low that it does not encourage conservation. In fact, prices do not
even cover production and maintenance costs, let alone treatment of wastewater.
Moving a comparatively heavily liquid such as water from its point of origin to
point of consumption entails significant costs, both for the initial
construction of the infrastructure and for operations and maintenance
thereafter. A large-scale transfer project to move water from Ain Salah to
Tamanrasset (completed in 2011) cost roughly $2.5 billion, not including the
ongoing operation and maintenance expenses. Desalination operations are even
more energy intensive and costly than water conveyance. Water produced at
desalination plants in the Arab region costs between 50 cents and 60 cents per
cubic meter — compared to around 5 cents per cubic meter for groundwater, and
20-50 cents per cubic meter for surface water. Although energy is a factor in
the higher price of water from desalination plants, more than half of the cost
is attributed to factors other than energy, such as labor and
chemicals.
Without investment from the government — not
just in big nameplate projects but also in routine maintenance and efforts to
improve efficiency and regulation — the availability and quality of Algeria's
water supply will keep declining. However, the government cannot foot the bill
alone. Private investment will be necessary to safeguard the country's water
supply. Public-private partnerships in the water sector are partly responsible
for the recent surge in desalination capacity. In addition, private
organizations are responsible for water management in some of the country's
largest cities, including Algiers, Annaba, Oran and Constantine.
Algeria's 2015-2019 Development Plan earmarked nearly $18 billion for water infrastructure projects. But throughout 2015 and into 2016, low oil prices have put a burden on the government's budget. Algiers' top spending priority will be security services, especially for energy assets. Furthermore, the country has a history of using social spending to quell civil unrest. President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika used public spending campaigns to fend off protests after the Arab Spring brought down other leaders in the region. Even with low oil prices straining Algiers' finances, the government is more likely to spend its reserves on subsidies than risk unrest. Whatever government takes power following the upcoming transition, it will likely continue with that strategy because Algiers and the populace remain wary of political unrest, a legacy of the country's decadelong civil war (1991-2002).
Water's Role in Algeria's Future
Because oil prices are expected to remain low
for a while, Algiers is searching for new sources of revenue. Algeria's vast
potential shale reserves are one such source. However, water security was a
common theme during recent protests regarding shale extraction, and concerns
about water scarcity could hinder the development of Algerian shale over the
next five to seven years. Technological solutions that limit or eliminate
water's role in hydraulic fracturing could allow Algeria to exploit its shale
reserves in the long term, although given the protest culture of the country and
region, demonstrations against hydraulic fracturing could still occur even if
water use is addressed. There is little doubt that water is part of a
circle of causation and control: It remains a key factor in keeping Algeria's
security situation manageable, which is vital to keeping the country attractive
to foreign investment, which in turn is crucial to maintaining the water supply.
The protest culture in Algeria means that subsidies that benefit the population
cannot be rolled back easily. Therefore, water prices will remain low and
foreign investment will still be needed to maintain or improve Algerians' access
to water.
Climate changes — specifically, higher
temperatures and less rain — are predicted for the coming decades in Algeria and
the wider region. At the same time, the population is expanding and urbanizing,
consuming more water than ever before. This adds to the stress on the country's
already scarce water resources. Greater desalination capacity, improvements to
existing infrastructure and additional water conveyance projects — created
through cooperation between the public and private sectors — could alleviate
some supply concerns, especially in urban areas. But, if short-term budgetary
problems lead Algiers to neglect the country's water infrastructure, the
longer-term implications are dire. Declining quality, infrequent availability or
more dependence on expensive water from desalination plants will contribute to
the potential for social unrest. As overexploitation creates more obvious
environmental degradation and further reduces water supplies, dissent will
become a greater threat to the government. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Algeria's Expensive Water
Problem 轉載自: https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/algerias-expensive-water-problem
Algeria's per capita water availability is less
than 300 cubic meters per year, which is well below the threshold for the U.N.
definition of water poverty. Many citizens simply do not have daily access to
running water. The
country's water is also unevenly distributed, with most of its surface water resources concentrated
in the north, along with the bulk of its population. There is water in the sparsely populated
central and southern parts of the country, but it is primarily groundwater — and
it is at risk. Not only are the aquifers beneath Algeria's desert very slow to
recharge, the non-renewable water drawn from them is sometimes called fossil
water because it has sat undisturbed in the aquifers for millennia. Algerian
groundwater withdrawals are roughly double the annual recharge rate, and the
problem is spreading: Even aquifers farther north are showing signs of
diminishing quantity and quality. Algiers' water management strategy focuses on
making the most of existing water resources through redistribution, increased
storage capacity and enhanced desalination capacity. But for a country with some
of the lowest water prices in the region, Algeria relies heavily on expensive
water management solutions. Without government investment, the availability and
quality of Algeria's water supply will continue to decline. However, the
government cannot foot the bill alone — private investment will be necessary to
safeguard the country's water supply. Climate changes — specifically, higher
temperatures and less rain — are predicted for the coming decades in Algeria and
the wider region. At the same time, the population is expanding and urbanizing,
consuming more water than ever before. Greater desalination capacity,
improvements to existing infrastructure and additional water conveyance projects
— created through cooperation between the public and private sectors — could
alleviate some supply concerns, especially in urban areas. But, if short-term
budgetary problems lead Algiers to neglect the country's water infrastructure,
the longer-term implications are dire. Declining quality, infrequent
availability or more dependence on expensive water from desalination plants will
contribute to the potential for social unrest.
Color
blindness affects millions of people worldwide. It affects 1 in 12 men and 1 in
200 women. The condition ranges from a variety of classes, red-green color
blindness being the most common.
Most
people who suffer from color blindness are not blind to color, but have a
reduced ability to see them. Color blindness is also called Color Vision
Deficiency (CVD) Source: enchroma
